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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, foreign investment matters reached the incredible 
amount of US$1.7 trillion.1 During 2010, international 
companies such as Enron Corp., Siemens AG, Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC, Telefónica, S.A., Exxon Mobil Corp., CEMEX S.A.B. de 
C.V., and Total, S.A., were all involved in international 
investment arbitrations.2 In these arbitrations, investors claimed 
that international treaties were violated and demanded that 
developing countries pay an average of US$343 million in 
damages per case.3 In nearly half of the cases, arbitral tribunals 
recognized these investors’ claims and awarded an average of 
US$10 million.4 
Public interest and human rights considerations usually 
arise in such investment arbitrations. To address these concerns, 
civil society has resorted to the institution of amicus curiae and 
has insisted that arbitral tribunals allow nonparties to make 
amicus curiae submissions.5 
                                                                                                             
1. SUSAN D. FRANCK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: WINNING, 
LOSING AND WHY, COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/international-investment-arbitration-winning-l
osing-and-why; cf. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2010: 
INVESTING IN A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2010, U.N. Sales 
No. E.10.II.D.2 (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf 
(indicating that the global economic crisis has negatively affected foreign direct 
investment in the past two years). 
2. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, 2010 Annual Report, at 55–93 (June 30, 
2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualReports&year=2010_Eng. 
3. FRANCK, supra note 1, at 2; see J.E. Alvarez, What I Did on My Summer Vacation 
(Part I): The Transparency of the International Investment Regime, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 27, 
2010, 6:21 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/27/what-i-did-on-my-summer-
vacation-part-i-the-transparency-of-the-international-investment-regime/ (suggesting 
that while a conflict between developed and developing country is still the typical case, 
the great evolution in recent decades of this international system of investment has also 
brought the following consequences: 
Today’s web of investment agreements is [not] easy to characterize . . . . 
Today, as many as one-third of BITs and FTAs are between countries of the 
Global South. Western states have entered into investment agreements 
among themselves (such as the NAFTA and the Energy Charter), and the ten 
states that have most frequently been sued by investors include Canada, the 
United States, the Czech Republic, and Poland. . . . States that some would 
expect to see among the top ten—such as poor African states with a history of 
investment problems—are not among the most frequent respondents). 
4. FRANCK, supra note 1, at 2. 
5. See infra Part II.A (explaining the benefits of accepting amicus briefs). 
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As will be presented, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic6 is 
a paradigmatic case regarding the admission of amicus briefs in 
investment arbitration.7 The arbitral tribunal’s May 19, 2005, 
order responded to a petition for transparency and participation 
filed by five international nongovernmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) as amici curiae.8 The tribunal decided to allow the 
NGOS to apply for leave to make an amicus submission.9 
This Article questions whether the regulation that currently 
exists on amicus briefs in international arbitration is optimal, or 
if these rules should be improved or even replaced by more 
efficient provisions. Part I discusses the importance of the 
amicus curiae institution in the national and international 
judicial spheres. Additionally, Part I shows that the use of amicus 
curiae has growing importance in the field of international 
investment arbitration, serving as a manifestation of the 
principle of transparency, which is being progressively 
introduced in this area. The analysis of a large number of 
provisions and some arbitration awards on this topic reinforces 
the idea that amicus curiae is a controversial institution, the 
importance of which is expected to further increase in the 
                                                                                                             
6. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., & Vivendi Universal, S.A 
v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by Five 
Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission 
(Feb. 12, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC693_En&caseId=C19 [hereinafter Suez, 
Amicus Decision]. 
7. See infra Part I.D.2 (analyzing the admissibility of amicus briefs by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)). 
8. See Aguas Argentina, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., 
& Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in 
Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, ¶ 21 (May 
19, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC516_En&caseId=C19. Courts have traditionally 
accepted the intervention of amicus curiae in ostensibly private litigation because those 
cases have involved issues of public interest and because decisions in those cases have 
the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons beyond those immediately 
involved as parties in the case. See id. ¶ 19 (“This case will consider the legality under 
international law, not domestic private law, of various actions and measures taken by 
governments. . . . The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the 
investment dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage systems of a large 
metropolitan area . . . . [This case] may raise a variety of complex public and 
international law questions, including human rights considerations.”). 
9. Id. ¶ 33. 
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future. Part II explains the reasons why amicus curiae generate 
such controversy, by presenting in detail various arguments 
advanced by NGOs and by investors and their law firms to 
universalize or eliminate the use of amicus briefs. This 
dichotomy arises because, in many cases, the interests of 
investors from developed countries conflict with those of 
developing countries. Part III of this Article reflects on how the 
interests of the developing countries can be best-protected by 
the legal regulation of amicus brief submissions in investment 
arbitration. Part III offers suggestions, ranging from the 
improvement of the current system to the elimination of the 
current scheme. The proposed new regime could mean that 
amicus briefs are requested ex officio by the arbitral tribunal or 
sent automatically to court by an institution that specializes in 
protecting the public interest in investment arbitrations. 
I. AMICUS BRIEFS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION 
This Part begins by presenting the origins and main 
characteristics of the institution of amicus curiae. After 
describing the rules governing amicus submissions in the courts 
of various common law countries, this Part focuses on the 
international arena. It analyzes the rules governing amicus 
submissions to various international human rights courts and in 
the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) economic sphere. 
After briefly discussing the origin and individualizing features of 
this kind of arbitration, this Part analyzes various international 
provisions governing the submissions of amicus curiae. As 
indicated, the existence of these provisions has, in recent times, 
allowed some NGOs to submit amicus briefs in international 
arbitrations of great economic and social relevance. The 
admission of an amicus brief in investment arbitration is such an 
important subject that international institutions as respected as 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) and the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”) have recently announced their willingness to develop 
research in this area. 
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A. Defining Amicus Curiae from a Historical Perspective 
The Latin term “amicus curiae” means “friend of the 
court.”10 As scholars indicate, it is very difficult to provide a 
comprehensive definition of this notion, since its features and 
functions have varied according to the historical moment and 
the country in which these amicus curiae interventions have 
been accepted.11 The origin of this notion is found in Roman 
law, where a court was provided with “legal information that was 
beyond its notice or expertise.”12 As time passed, amici curiae 
were no longer passersby intervening in a process on their own 
initiative.13 Namely, in the United Kingdom the intervention of 
amicus curiae has, in most cases, required an invitation from the 
court.14 
                                                                                                             
10. Throughout this Article, the term “amicus curiae” will be pluralized using the 
Latin term “amici curiae.” This expression is used more frequently in the international 
arena, although some texts use other terms such as “third-party intervention” or 
“nondisputing party participation.” See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 36.2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; NAFTA Free 
Trade Comm’n, Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation (Oct. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_
upload_file660_6893.pdf. The request for intervention, made by amicus curiae to the 
court, is called “amicus brief” for the purposes of this Article. 
11. See John Bellhouse & Anthony Lavers, The Modern Amicus Curiae: A Role in 
Arbitration?, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 187, 188 (2004); see also Michael K. Lowman, Comment, 
The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1992) (reflecting on the historical evolution on this notion). 
12. See REAGAN WM. SIMPSON & MARY VASALY, THE AMICUS BRIEF: HOW TO WRITE 
IT AND USE IT EFFECTIVELY 1 (3d ed. 2010); see also Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae: 
American Development of English Institutions, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1017 (1967) 
(explaining the characteristics of amicus curiae in Roman law). 
13. See Angell, supra note 12, at 1017 (“The amicus appears to have been 
originally a bystander who, without any direct interest in the litigation, intervened on 
his own initiative to make a suggestion to the court on matters of fact and law within his 
own knowledge: the death of a party, manifest error, collusion . . . .”); see also Lowman, 
supra note 11, at 1244. 
14. See Bellhouse & Lavers, supra note 11, at 190 (“The traditional function of the 
amicus curiae in the English courts . . . [was] a practice, rather than an enshrined right, 
whereby arguments on points of law, or information, can be presented before the 
tribunal, with its permission and often by its active invitation, which would otherwise 
not be heard because they did not form part of the respective cases of the litigants 
represented. . . . [I]t has been used to ‘fill-in-the cracks’ which are sometimes left by a 
litigation system better suited to resolution of bi-partisan conflicts, as an alternative to 
allowing actual intervention by third parties or where such intervention is not an 
option.”); see also Johannes Chan, Focus on Ma Case: Amicus Curiae and Non-Party 
Intervention, 27 HONG KONG L.J., 1997, at 394. 
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In the United States, the first case referring to the 
intervention of a friend of the court occurred in 1823 when the 
US Supreme Court requested Henry Clay’s intervention in Green 
v. Biddle15 to provide information about an alleged collusion 
between the parties.16 From that moment on, the submission of 
amicus briefs has become more widespread in the United States, 
both in the Supreme Court and on appeal.17 The expression 
“amicus curiae” is currently used in the United States for those 
who, without being part of the litigation proceeding, request 
that the court allow them to provide information relevant for 
the resolution of the dispute.18 These amicus submissions aim to 
assist the court by broadening its perspective on controversial 
issues.19 Although amici curiae cannot act directly as an advocate 
for a party, they very often have an interest in the litigation.20 
                                                                                                             
15. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 17 (1823). 
16. See Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of 
Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 36 (1983) (noting that the 
Supreme Court’s first use of amicus curiae in Green v. Biddle marked a turning point 
because the Court found it to be highly useful); see also Angell, supra note 12, at 1018 
(examining the first interventions of amicus curiae in US courts). 
17. See generally Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of 
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807, 828 
(2004) (“It is possible that the recent and dramatic increases in amicus fillings in the 
Supreme Court have resulted in a ‘routinization’ of how amicus briefs are considered 
by the Court.”); see also SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 12, at 8–10 (“In the last fifty 
years, while the United States Supreme Court has not increased its output of opinions, 
amicus filings have increased more than 800 percent. . . . The amicus brief [also] 
appears with regularity in federal courts of appeals and also in state supreme courts 
and state intermediate appellate courts.”). 
18. See SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 12, at 3–6. See generally Susan L. Thomas, 3B 
C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 14 (2011) (explaining the characteristics of amicus submissions 
in the US legal system). 
19. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 830 (2000) (“Amicus briefs clearly do 
matter in many contexts, and this means that the Court is almost certainly influenced 
by additional information supplementing that provided by the parties to the case.”). 
But see James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information 
at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365, 382 (1997) (questioning whether amici always 
submit supplemental information). 
20. See Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists before the Court, 101 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (1953) (stating that amicus briefs can be used as a lobbying 
device). 
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B. The Role of Amicus Curiae in Other Areas of Law 
Along with its development in the judicial sphere of some 
countries, the institution of amicus curiae has gained increasing 
importance in the international arena.21 This Section presents 
the rules governing the submission of amicus briefs before the 
various national courts that admit them. It also discusses the 
rules governing the intervention of amici curiae internationally, 
particularly in the fields of human rights and interstate 
commerce. When analyzing the different provisions allowing the 
admission of amicus briefs in human rights and interstate 
commerce, this Section determines that the extent and 
characteristics of amicus participation depends on the 
governing rules and on the court’s discretion to apply such 
rules. 
1. National Courts 
As noted, the US Supreme Court has a long tradition of 
accepting amicus briefs.22 Statistics show that the recourse to this 
institution has become commonplace. In recent years, amicus 
curiae briefs have been filed in eighty-five percent of cases 
pending before the US Supreme Court.23 Amici include large 
numbers of individuals, institutions, and international 
organizations like the European Union.24 
Courts in the United States have rules governing amicus 
briefs. In the US Supreme Court, Rule 37 governs their 
submission.25 Most importantly, it requires that a brief provide 
new and relevant information, indicate if the author has 
received monetary compensation from a party, and comply with 
                                                                                                             
21. See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining the importance of amicus submissions in the 
international sphere). 
22. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
23. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 19, at 744; see also Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? 
Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 34 (2004) 
(discussing generally the impressive “magnitude of amicus briefs” filed in the Supreme 
Court). 
24. See Cedric Ryngaert, The European Commission’s Amicus Curiae Brief in the 
Alvarez-Machain Case, 6 INT’L L. F. DROIT INT’L 55, 57 (2004). 
25. SUP. CT. R. 37 (specifying all the requisites to submit an amicus brief to the US 
Supreme Court). 
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procedural requirements.26 Rule 29 of the US Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure regulates the amicus brief process in US 
Circuit Courts.27 This rule establishes different consent 
requirements based on the nature of the party submitting the 
brief and introduces content requirements and time limits.28 
Other common law countries also allow the submission of 
amicus briefs to their highest legal authority. This is the case in 
the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, and the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom.29 At this point, a distinction 
should be made between the rules recognizing the power of the 
court to appoint amicus curiae (Australia and Canada) and the 
rules that permit the intervention of amicus curiae if certain 
requirements are met (South Africa and the United Kingdom).30 
This differentiation, revisited in Part III of this Article, also 
appears when analyzing how various international tribunals 
regulate the institution of amicus curiae. 
2. International Courts of Human Rights 
In the current sphere of international human rights, there 
are various international courts that accept third-party 
interventions in the form of amicus briefs.31 The International 
Court of Justice allows the submission of amicus curiae briefs in 
both contentious and advisory proceedings.32 In a contentious 
proceeding, amicus briefs can only be submitted by public 
                                                                                                             
26. Id. See generally Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of 
U.S.-Based Amicus Curiae in Non-U.S. and Multi-National Courts as a Means of Advancing 
the Public Interest, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 88, 92–110 (2004) (analyzing Rule 37 and its 
implications on submissions). 
27. See FED. R. APP. P. 29. 
28. See id. (listing the requisites to submit an amicus brief in the US appellate 
system). 
29. High Court Amendment Rules 2010 (No. 1) (Cth), sch 1, Rule 44.04 (Austl.); 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, Rule 92, SOR/2002-156 (Can.); Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa, (GN) R979/1998, Rule 16 (S. Afr.); Supreme Court of 
United Kingdom: The Supreme Court Rules, 2009, S.I. 1603 (L. 17), Rule 35 (U.K.) 
(enumerating the requisites in order to submit an amicus brief to each of these 
Tribunals). 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining which international courts admit amicus 
submissions). 
32. See Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 34(2), 66(2), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
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international organizations33 on their own initiative or upon the 
request of the court.34 In an advisory proceeding, a broader 
group of subjects—states or organizations—is allowed to present 
written or oral statements and to comment on the statements 
made by others.35 
On a regional level, the Rules of the European Court of 
Human Rights allow third-party interventions.36 Rule 44 gives 
the president of the tribunal broad powers to specify the 
intervention of contracting parties, the Commissioner of 
Human Rights, and any person concerned with the case.37 
Additionally, Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights also establishes requirements 
that amicus submissions should meet.38 Analyzing recent 
                                                                                                             
33. See Ruth Mackenzie, The Amicus Curiae in International Courts: Toward Common 
Procedural Approaches?, in CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE 
BODIES 295, 296 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2005) (stating that nongovernmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) have been prohibited from filing amicus briefs); see also Dinah 
Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial 
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L. L. 611, 620–23 (1994) (discussing the legislative history 
behind International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) Statute Articles 34 and 66 in defining 
public international organizations and international organizations and the role NGOs 
can play in ICJ proceedings). 
34. ICJ Statute, supra note 32, art. 34.2 (“The Court . . . may request of public 
international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive 
such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative.”). 
35. ICJ Statute, supra note 32, art. 66.4 (“States and organizations having 
presented written or oral statements or both shall be permitted to comment on the 
statements made by other states or organizations . . . .”); see THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 545–63, 1427–43 (Andreas 
Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006) (analyzing Articles 34 and 66); Shelton, supra note 33, at 
621–23 (discussing the issue of nongovernment organizations as international 
organizations submitting amicus curiae briefs). 
36. COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RULES OF COURT, 
Rule 44 (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/6AC1A02E-9A3C-
4E06-94EF-E0BD377731DA/0/REGLEMENT_EN_Avril2011.pdf. 
37. See id., Rule 44(3), 44(5); see also THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 205 (Pieter Van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) 
(referring to the old Rule 36.1 and noting that the president is left a certain margin of 
discretion with respect to inviting parties to submit written comments or take part in 
hearings); Anthony Lester, Amici Curiae: Third-Party Interventions Before the European 
Court of Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 341, 
341–50 (Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988) (explaining how the rule 
referred to third-party intervention). 
38. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF 
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 44 (2009), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic20.Rules%20of%20Procedure%20of%
20the%20Court.htm. 
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decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it 
seems that amicus briefs are often submitted and that judgments 
make abundant reference to these submissions.39 
Some international criminal tribunals also accept or 
request amicus briefs. This is the case of the International 
Criminal Court, and of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (“SCSL”).40 While in the cases of the ICTY, ICTR, and 
SCSL, the admission of amicus briefs is based on the generic 
powers of the court to regulate the process, the International 
Criminal Court has more specific rules.41 Rule 103 of the 
International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
allows the Chamber to invite or give leave for a state, 
organization, or person to submit written or oral observations 
on any issue that the Chamber deems appropriate and at any 
stage of the proceedings.42 Additionally, the International 
Criminal Court gives a very prominent role to the prosecutor, 
who is empowered to “seek additional information from States, 
organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or 
                                                                                                             
39. See Monica Pinto, NGOs and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in CIVIL 
SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE BODIES 47, 55–56 (Tullio Treves et 
al. eds., 2005) (stating that amicus briefs are popular). 
40. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 103, ICC-ASP/1/3 
(2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-
B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf [hereinafter 
Int’l Crim. Ct. Rules of Procedure]; Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 74, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.45 (Dec. 10, 2009), available 
at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/
IT032_rev44_en.pdf; Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Rule 74, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.2074 (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://unictr.org/
Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100209.pdf; Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Rule 74 (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yNjqn5TIYKs%3d&tabid=176. 
41. See generally Sarah Williams & Hannah Woolaver, The Role of the Amicus Curiae 
Before International Criminal Tribunals, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 151, 153–56 (2006) 
(examining the role of amicus curiae before international criminal tribunals, including 
how and when amici are granted permission to appear, the criteria used by the courts 
in determining whether to accept amicus submissions, and how the information 
provided is used by the courts in their deliberations). For a reflection of the amicus 
rules of the international tribunals, see Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Problem of Self-
Representation at International Criminal Tribunals: Striking a Balance between Fairness and 
Effectiveness, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64, 75–77 (2006). 
42. Int’l Crim. Ct. Rules of Procedure, supra note 40, Rule 103.1. 
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nongovernmental organizations, or other reliable sources that 
he or she deems appropriate,” when considering whether to 
initiate an investigation.43 
3. World Trade Organization 
In international trade, Article 13 of the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in 
the WTO (“DSU”) regulates the arbitration panel’s right to seek 
information.44 The treatment to be accorded to unsolicited 
amicus letters is a controversial issue.45 In the WTO appellate 
procedure, the appellate body has considered that its right to 
accept amicus submissions arises from the broad provisions of 
Article 17(9) of the DSU.46 The 2010 Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review contain additional rules regarding third-party 
participants.47 In practice, many of these submissions are 
rejected, which has generated controversy.48 Likewise, whether 
panels are required to give reasoned explanation of their 
decisions is still being debated.49  
                                                                                                             
43. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15(2), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; id. art. 54(3) (further elaborating on the 
prosecutor’s powers and duties). 
44. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; see Josh Robbins, False 
Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals under the Hot-Rolled Lead 
/ Asbestos Doctrine, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 317, 319 (2003) (discussing Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in the WTO (“DSU”) 
provisions, including Article 13 that relate to amicus submissions in panel-level 
proceedings). 
45. One of the most recent examples in this regard is the unsolicited letter from 
an Australian private entity (Apple and Pear Australia Ltd.) received by the panel in the 
case Australia-Apples. See Simon Lester, Unsolicited Letter from an Australian Private Entity, 
INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010, 10:51 AM), 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/wto_disputes/. 
46. See DSU, supra note 44, art. 17(9). 
47. See World Trade Organization, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Rule 24, 
WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
48. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 98–100 (2004). 
49. The Appellate Body has stated that “[t]he grant of leave to file a brief . . . does 
not imply that the Appellate Body will address, in its Report, the legal arguments made 
in such a brief.” Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 52(5), WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). In 
another case, the Appellate Body referred to amicus letters, but concluded that they 
were not going to be taken into account, stating: 
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C. The Acceptance of Amicus Curiae in Provisions Regulating 
International Investment Arbitration 
In recent decades, investments in developing countries 
have grown into a widespread phenomenon. Along with the 
benefits that investments can generate for the development of 
the host state, the proliferation of investment also increased the 
number of cases in which the investor wants to initiate legal 
claims against the developing state.50 In most cases, investors 
have preferred a mechanism other than going to national 
courts. Investors often question the expertise of local judges as 
well as the efficiency and transparency of the host state’s legal 
system.51 
As international investment arbitrations have become more 
widespread, the citizens of developing countries and numerous 
NGOs have demanded that their voices be heard. Since the 
controversy is often connected with national policies, and the 
ultimate resolution will have direct effects on the population, 
transparency has been deemed necessary to the entire 
                                                                                                             
We are of the opinion that we have the legal authority under the DSU to 
accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we find it 
pertinent and useful to do so. In this appeal, we have not found it necessary 
to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in rendering our 
decision. 
Appellate Body Report, United States–Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, ¶ 42, 
WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000). This approach of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) panels has led developing countries to raise several issues with the European 
Community. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, 
India’s Questions to the European Communities and its Member States on Their Proposal 
Relating to Improvements of the DSU, TN/DS/W/5 (May 7, 2002). See generally Federico 
Ortino, The Impact of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Settlement of Trade and Investment 
Disputes, in ECONOMIC LAW AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD 301, 316 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 
2009). 
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (referring to new ways of investment 
disputes that do not follow the classic pattern of developed-developing countries). 
51. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1287–88 (2009); see also Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, 
Denial of Justice and International Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 738–43 (2009) 
(reflecting on the advantages of investment arbitration). In this Article, the term 
“transparency” refers to the way of managing the arbitration procedure. Therefore, 
this allusion is not linked to the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations—as 
a manifestation of the fair and equitable treatment. 
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arbitration process.52 Responding to these requests, in recent 
years several provisions contained in both bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and in arbitration rules have incorporated, 
to a greater or lesser degree, the principle of transparency.53 
One manifestation of this broad principle is the admission of 
amicus briefs.54 
1. The Origin of International Investment Arbitration 
Many companies want to invest in countries where 
production costs are lower than in their own country.55 
However, international investment also creates fear in developed 
countries, because developing countries that offer economic 
incentives generally do not have stable political and legal 
systems.56 In order to protect foreign investment, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (“BITs”) began to appear in the late 
1950’s.57 The first BIT, between Germany and Pakistan, dates 
back to 1959.58 BITs’ main objective is to protect investments 
made by investors of a state party in the territory of another state 
party, and thus increase foreign direct investment between the 
signatory states.59 The use of BITs has since spread to the point 
that they are widely used throughout the investment world 
today.60 There are also various free-trade agreements that 
include an investment chapter similar to the BITs.61 All these 
texts have a common core. They guarantee the investor a series 
                                                                                                             
52. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 133 (2008); see also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 233–34 (2007). 
53. See infra Part I.C.3 (explaining the relevance of the principle of transparency). 
54. See infra Part I.C.3. 
55. See Amanda Perry, An Ideal Legal System for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment? 
Some Theory and Reality, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1627, 1644–45 (2000) (analyzing the 
effect of US free trade on US and international labor). 
56. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 3–7; see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 3–5 (explaining the origin and evolution of international 
investments). 
57. THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, 
REALITIES, OPINIONS xxxii–xxxiii (José E. Alvarez et al. eds., 2011) (reflecting on the 
origin of BITs) [hereinafter EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME]. 
58. See id. 
59. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 18–27; see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 26–34 (analyzing the content of bilateral investment treaties). 
60. EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME, supra note 57, at xxxiii. 
61. Id. 
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of substantive rights, such as national treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and fair 
expropriation,62 as well as access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms, such as international arbitration, for resolving 
disputes that may arise from the investment.63 
In 1965, the World Bank formulated the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (“Washington Convention”) to address the 
resolution of investment conflicts through arbitration.64 The 
Washington Convention established the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).65 ICSID 
provides a specialized mechanism for conciliation and 
arbitration of international investment disputes.66 
Many BITs, multilateral treaties, national laws, and 
investment contracts refer to ICSID as the mechanism to resolve 
investment conflicts.67 As a result, this organization currently has 
144 member states.68 Indeed, on June 30, 2010, the number of 
cases registered by ICSID since its inception reached 319.69 In 
the fiscal year 2010, ICSID registered twenty-seven new 
proceedings, representing a twelve percent increase from the 
previous fiscal year.70 These statistics encourage ICSID to 
present itself as “the leading international arbitration institution 
devoted to investor-state dispute settlement.”71 
                                                                                                             
62. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 119–94 (explaining the meaning 
and extension of these standards of protection); see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 
52, at 200–349 (analyzing the content of bilateral investment treaties). 
63. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 211–90; see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 45–55. 
64. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
Washington Convention]. 
65. See id. art. 1 (“The purpose of the [ICSID] shall be to provide facilities for 
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and 
nationals of other Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention.”). 
66. See About ICSID, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISP., 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
67. See id. 
68. Int’l Ctr. for the Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 2, at 9. 
69. Id. at 21. 
70. Id. 
71. About ICSID, supra note 66. 
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Aside from addressing cases conducted under the 
Washington Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration (“ICSID Rules”), the ICSID secretariat also provides 
administrative support to investor-state arbitrations conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (“UNCITRAL Rules”). 
The UNCITRAL Rules have also been applied by other arbitral 
tribunals, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague, Netherlands, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
and the ICC.72 
2. Special Characteristics of International Investment 
Arbitration Justifying the Implementation of the Principle of 
Transparency 
Confidentiality and privacy are main characteristics of 
international commercial arbitration.73 These have traditionally 
been two factors that persuaded parties to go to arbitration 
instead of going to court.74 The public nature of court 
proceedings and judgments have, in many cases, made 
companies involved in a trade dispute opt for arbitration.75 
Arbitration, an extrajudicial mechanism, allows companies to 
shield their dealings from public scrutiny through a variety of 
rules and procedures, including Article 20(7) of the ICC Rules, 
Article 10 of the International Dispute Resolution Procedures of 
the American Arbitration Association, Article 30 of the 
                                                                                                             
72. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., Latest 
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, at 2, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3 
(2010). 
73. See Michael Pyles, Confidentiality, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 501, 536–39 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill 
eds., 2d ed. 2008) (linking the notion of privacy with the private character of the 
hearing and the concept of confidentiality with the non-disclosure of documents and 
information obtained during an arbitration or even with of the existence of the process 
itself); see also Aníbal Sabater, Towards Transparency in Arbitration (A Cautious Approach), 
5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 47 (2010) (arguing that the push for transparency in arbitration 
is the result of a political effort to reconsider the role of investment arbitral tribunals). 
Note that privacy entails the prohibition of third parties from attending and 
confidentiality imposes obligations on the arbitration parties. See Pyles, supra, at 538. 
74. See Gu Weixia, Note, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in International 
Commercial Arbitration?, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 607 (2004) (discussing the 
confidentiality and privacy in arbitration); see also Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions between 
Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121, 
121 (2003) (analyzing the value of confidentiality in international arbitration). 
75. See Weixia, supra note 74, at 607; see also Buys, supra note 74, at 121. 
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Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and Articles 73–76 of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization Arbitration Rules.76 Yet, despite the 
traditionally secretive nature of arbitration, this means of 
dispute resolution has grown more transparent. Recently, 
mechanisms have been implemented by which to publicize 
arbitration awards.77 Notwithstanding some recent growth in 
transparency, the submission of amicus briefs is still not allowed 
in arbitration between private parties. 
Many commentators argue that the specific characteristics 
of international investment arbitration justify the introduction 
of exceptions to the confidentiality and privacy principles 
governing international commercial arbitration.78 The same 
approach has been suggested by some arbitral tribunals. For 
example, in United Parcel Service v. Canada, the tribunal stated: 
“It recalls as well the emphasis placed on the value of greater 
transparency for proceedings such as these. Such proceedings 
are not now, if they ever were, to be equated to the standard run 
of international commercial arbitration between private 
parties.”79 
                                                                                                             
76. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 20.7 (1998), 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4093/index.html; AM. ARB. 
ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art. 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994#Conduct%20of%20the%20Arbitration; LONDON 
CT. OF INT’L ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES art. 30 (1998), available at 
http://www.lcia.org (select the “LCIA Arbitration Rules” hyperlink); WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO ARBITRATION RULES arts. 73–76, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/ (regulating confidentiality in their 
arbitration procedures). 
77. Compare UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 32(5), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html (select “Text” hyperlink) (“The 
award may be made public only with the consent of both parties.”), with UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 34(5), U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Dec. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010
Arbitration_rules.html (select “Text” hyperlink) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules] (“An 
award may be made public with the consent of all parties or where and to the extent 
disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in 
relation to legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority.”). 
78. See Bjorklund, supra note 51, at 1288; see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the 
Resolution of Investor-State Disputes—Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 KAN. 
L. REV. 1339, 1348–53 (2006) (outlining the arguments for transparency promotion in 
investment arbitration). 
79. United Parcel Serv. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for 
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶ 70 (NAFTA Arb. 2001), 
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Investment arbitration is specific by nature.80 First, note that 
one of the parties to the investment arbitration is a state, which 
gives this arbitration a hybrid public-private nature.81 Moreover, 
the conflict under discussion in international investment 
arbitration usually transcends the individual interests of the state 
and the company involved.82 The investment arbitration 
processes have a substantial influence on the population’s ability 
to enjoy basic human rights, such as a healthy environment or 
access to water.83 As a result, these societies are demanding that 
their opinions be taken into account during relevant 
international investment arbitrations.84 Furthermore, 
condemnatory awards have a tremendous impact on the state’s 
public purse and, therefore, on the taxpayer’s interests.85 
These social demands are reflected in the implementation 
of transparency in international investment arbitration.86 The 
notion of transparency in investment arbitral proceedings is 
broad, covering various issues such as making information about 
the arbitration and the award itself publicly available, giving 
permission to third parties to attend and participate in public 
hearings, offering access to key arbitration documents and the 
ability to file written submissions. 
                                                                                                             
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipation
AmiciCuriae.pdf [hereinafter United Parcel Service, Decision on Amicus Curiae] 
80. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 9; see also Catherine A. Rogers, The 
Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 101, 117 (2007); 
Alessandra Asteriti & Christian J. Tams, Transparency and Representation of the Public 
Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration, INT’L INV. L. & COMP. PUB. L. (forthcoming) at 5, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618843. 
81. Washington Convention, supra note 64, art. 25(1). In cases where the 
Washington Convention is applicable, the public party can also be “any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State.” Id. 
art. 25(3). 
82. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 57 (highlighting the public nature of 
the issues posed in investment arbitration); see also Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing 
Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the 
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 809 (2008). 
83. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (explaining public interest protection). 
84. See Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in 
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 252 (2007) (reflecting on 
the role of the society); see also Barnali Choudhury, Democratic Implications Arising from 
the Intersection of Investment Arbitration and Human Rights, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 983 (2009) 
(analyzing possible solutions for instilling democracy into investment arbitration). 
85. See Alvarez, supra note 3. 
86. See Odumosu, supra note 84; see also Choudhury, supra note 84, at 983. 
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3. The Principle of Transparency in Recent BITs 
Following the aforementioned trend towards transparency, 
some recent BITs have included various manifestations of the 
principle of transparency.87 The US 2004 Model BIT provides 
for documents to be made available to the public,88 for open 
hearings,89 and for the possibility of submitting amicus briefs.90 
The most recent US BITs also reflect these principles, as 
illustrated in Articles 28 and 29 of the US-Uruguay BIT and the 
US-Rwanda BITs.91  
Canada’s current 2004 Model Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (“FIPA”), apart from 
ensuring that all documents will be promptly made available to 
the public and that all hearings will be open to the public, 
confirms in Article 39 the possibility of submitting amicus briefs 
                                                                                                             
87. For contrary examples of recent BITs that do not address this issue see TREATY 
BETWEEN THE FED. REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND _____ CONCERNING THE 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROT. OF INVS. (2008), available at 
http://italaw.com/investmenttreaties.htm (follow “German 2008 Model BIT” 
hyperlink); BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROT. OF INVS. BETWEEN 
THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA AND _____: COLOMBIAN MODEL (August 2007), available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/inv_model_bit_colombia.pdf (publishing Colombia’s 
Model BIT); DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE AND 
THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF (. . .) ON THE RECIPROCAL PROMOTION AND PROT. OF 
INVS. (2006), available at http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf; 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOV’T OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF _____ FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROT. OF INVS. (2003), available at 
http://italaw.com/Indiamodelbit.htm. 
88. See TREATY BETWEEN THE GOV’T OF THE UNITED STATES OF AM. AND THE GOV’T 
OF [COUNTRY] COVERING THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF RECIPROCAL PROT. OF INV. art. 
29(1) (2004), available at http://italaw.com/investmenttreaties.htm (follow “US 2004 
Model BIT” hyperlink). 
89. See id. art. 29(2) (“The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and 
shall determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical 
arrangements. However, any disputing party that intends to use information designated 
as protected information in a hearing shall so advise the tribunal. The tribunal shall 
make appropriate arrangements to protect the information from disclosure.”). 
90. See id. art. 28(3) (“The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and 
consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing 
party.”). 
91. See Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, arts. 28–29, Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 110-23; Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uruguay, arts. 28–29, Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-09. 
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to the tribunal and develops guidelines for their acceptance.92 In 
line with this, the last FIPAs signed by Canada also address the 
issue of transparency. For example, the Canada-Slovak Republic 
FIPA, signed on July 20, 2010, contains Annex B.II, which 
extensively regulates participation by the nondisputing 
contracting party.93 Further, the 2007 Norway Draft Model BIT 
devotes Article 18 to the participation in the proceedings and 
includes a reference to amicus briefs.94 For multilateral 
investment treaties, Article 10.21 of the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement Rules on 
transparency in the arbitration proceeding95 and Article 10.20 
allows nondisputing parties to make oral and written 
submissions.96 
In some cases,97 North American Free Trade Agreements 
(“NAFTA”) tribunals applied the broadly drafted Articles 15 and 
25 of the UNCITRAL Rules to authorize nondisputing party 
interventions.98 In October 2003, the Free Trade Commission 
released a statement on nondisputing party participation (“FTC 
Statement”),99 describing the procedures for this 
participation.100 
                                                                                                             
92. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND ____ FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROT. 
OF INVS. arts. 38(1), 38(3), 39 (2004), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf. 
93. See Agreement between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion 
and Protection of Foreign Investments, Can.-Slovak Republic, Annex B.II, Jul. 20, 2010, 
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
assets/pdfs/EN_Canada_Slovakia_FIPA.pdf [hereinafter Canada-Slovak BIT]. 
94. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY AND _____ FOR THE 
PROMOTION AND PROT. OF INVS. art. 18(3) (2007), available at http://italaw.com/
investmenttreaties.htm (select “Norway 2007 Draft Model BIT” hyperlink). 
95. See Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 10.21, 
Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text 
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. 
96. See id. art. 10.20(2) (“A non-disputing Party may make oral and written 
submissions to the tribunal regarding the interpretation of this Agreement.”); id. art. 
10.20(3) (“The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”). 
97. See infra Part I.C.4. 
98. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 77, arts. 15, 25. 
99. The Free Trade Commission is “[m]ade up of ministerial representatives from 
the NAFTA partners.” North American Free Trade Agreement: About NAFTA, 
NAFTANOW.ORG, http://www.naftanow.org/about/default_en.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 
2012). It “[s]upervises the implementation and further elaboration of the Agreement 
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In other geographical areas, multilateral investment treaties 
such as the Investment Agreement for the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa101 COMESA Common Investment 
Area102 also regulate the amicus submissions.103 
4. Transparency in NAFTA and ICSID Arbitrations 
In June 2005, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Investment Committee released a document 
asking for greater transparency and third party participation in 
investor-state dispute settlement procedures.104 This document 
                                                                                                             
and helps resolve disputes arising from its interpretation.” Id. It also “[o]versees the 
work of the NAFTA committees, working groups, and other subsidiary bodies.” Id. 
100. See generally J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of 
Investor-State Arbitration through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL 
L.J. 681, 709 (2007) (discussing the Free Trade Commission’s statement). 
101. See Overview of COMESA: COMESA’s Priorities and Objectives, COMESA, 
http://www.comesa.int/about/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75&I
temid=106 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (describing the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa as “an organization of free independent sovereign states which have 
agreed to co-operate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of 
all their people and as such it has a wide-ranging series of objectives which necessarily 
include in its priorities the promotion of peace and security in the region”). 
102. See COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENT FOR THE COMESA COMMON INVESTMENT ARENA 20, 31–32 (2007), 
available at http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/Exercise%20
Materials/invagreecomesa.pdf. Article 8: Amicus Curiae states: 
(1) The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus 
curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party (the 
‘submitter’). . . . (3) The [COMESA Common Investment Area] Committee 
may establish and make available to the public a standard form for applying 
for status as amicus curiae. . . . (4) Amicus curiae submissions may relate to 
any matter covered by this Agreement that is relevant to the claim before the 
tribunal. 
Id. Annex A, art. 8. Article 8 is included in Annex A, devoted to state-state arbitration. 
Nevertheless, it also applies to investor-state disputes. Id. art. 28(8) (“An arbitral 
tribunal shall be open to the receipt of amicus curiae submissions in accordance with 
the process set out in Annex A with necessary adaption for application to investor-state 
disputes under this Article.”). 
103. See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations—Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ch. 11 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/22260.pdf (regulating only the issues of disclosure of 
information, awards and notices of arbitration, and using the concept “non disputing 
party” to designate “the Party of the disputing investor” instead of a third party). 
104. See THE OECD INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, TRANSPARENCY AND THIRD PARTY 
PARTICIPATION IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (2005), available 
at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34786913.pdf (“[A]dditional transparency, in 
particular in relation to the publication of arbitral awards, subject to necessary 
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substantially refers to NAFTA’s 2003 Free Trade Commission 
Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation.105 This 2003 
Statement establishes detailed procedures regarding written 
submissions by nondisputing parties.106 Moreover, it is an 
important development with respect to Article 15(1) of the 1976 
UNCITRAL Rules.107 Article 15(1) was the primary rule 
previously used by NAFTA tribunals to accept such submissions 
“[s]ubject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided 
that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of 
the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case.”108 As explained below,109 NAFTA 
arbitrations show an early recognition of the institution of the 
amicus curiae and a new concern for shaping the characteristics 
of their intervention. 
In analyzing the rules of the ICSID, it appears that the 
Centre has made a recent effort to submit their arbitration 
proceedings to public scrutiny.110 In this sense, Rule 48(4) of the 
ICSID Rules states that: “The Centre shall not publish the award 
without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, 
promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal 
reasoning of the Tribunal.”111 Additionally, Rule 32(2) affirms 
that: 
Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation 
with the Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides 
the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses 
and experts during their testimony, and officers of the 
                                                                                                             
safeguards for the protection of confidential business and governmental information, is 
desirable to enhance effectiveness and public acceptance of international investment 
arbitration, as well as contributing to the further development of a public body of 
jurisprudence. . . . [I]t may also be desirable to allow third party participation, subject 
however to clear and specific guidelines.”). 
105. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, supra note 10. 
106. Id. ¶ B.1. 
107. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 77. 
108. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, REVISING THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 
TO ADDRESS INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration_dec.pdf. 
109. See infra Part I.D.1 (illustrating the role of amicus curiae in NAFTA). 
110. Washington Convention, supra note 64, pmbl. 
111. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), Rule 
48(4), at 122, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp 
[hereinafter ICSID Rules]. 
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Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, 
subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The 
Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for the 
protection of proprietary or privileged information.112 
Consequently, this provision requires that both parties 
agree to allow nondisputing parties to attend the hearings.113 
This implies that there have been very few public hearings 
throughout ICSID’s practice. However, the possibility of public 
hearings has been accepted in 2010 cases such as Commerce 
Group Corp. v. El Salvador,114 and Grand River Enterprises Six 
Nations, Ltd. v. United States.115 
Article 37(2) of the ICSID Rules states that: 
[T]he Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a 
party to the dispute . . . to file a written submission with 
the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the 
dispute. In determining whether to allow such a filing, the 
Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to 
which: (a) the non-disputing party submission would assist 
the Tribunal . . . (b) the non-disputing party submission 
would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) 
the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the 
proceeding.116 
The possible interpretation of Article 37(2) raises doubt 
among scholars, specifically in regards to the notion of 
                                                                                                             
112. Id. Rule 32(2), at 115. 
113. See, e.g., Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Tribunals 
Apply New Rules on Amicus Curiae, WHITE & CASE LLP, at 4 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/1c8e8d96-9588-4e86-8c13-
523252138974/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/37e1af34-0172-4412-a094-
5639d34243e6/article_ICSID_Tribunals.pdf (originally published in 22 MEALEY’S INT’L 
ARB. REP. 18 (Feb. 2007)) (referring to the veto right that each party has); see also 
VanDuzer, supra note 100, at 704. 
114. Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Commerce Group 
Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/17) Public Hearing (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=
AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement68. 
115. Press Release, Int’l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Grand River Enters. 
Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules Proceeding (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=
AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement40. 
116. ICSID Rules, supra note 111, Rule 37, at 117. 
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significant interest. As such, varying positions may be supported 
with regards to what meets this requirement. For example, an 
NGO may have to show a real “pecuniary interest,” which means 
it must experience a “special damage” on their interest or an 
“intellectual or emotional interest.”117 Accordingly, the Article 
sets out a system in which the arbitral tribunal has to consult the 
parties, but allows the court to authorize written submissions 
from nondisputing parties even if it does not have both parties’ 
approval.118 When making a decision regarding the amicus 
submissions, Article 37(2) gives the court a nonexhaustive set of 
criteria to be taken into account and offers some procedural 
considerations.119  
D. The Role Given to Amicus Curiae in Recent International 
Investment Arbitrations 
This Section provides an empirical study on the application 
of these rules in various investment arbitrations in which 
nonparties were asked to intervene.120 The analysis of these cases 
will focus on: (1) the various requirements that the different 
arbitral panels have imposed regarding when to accept 
interventions, (2) the allegations made by NGOs in each 
petition for participation and in amicus briefs, and (3) the 
importance granted to these allegations in the final awards. 
1. Amicus Curiae and NAFTA 
NAFTA arbitrations are the first to have addressed the issue 
of amicus intervention in international investment arbitration. 
In the case Methanex Corp. v. United States, a Canadian company 
                                                                                                             
117. See Ross P. Buckley & Paul Blyschak, Guarding the Open Door: Non-party 
Participation before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 14 (Univ. of 
South Wales Law Sch. Research Paper No. 2007-33), BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
989264. 
118. See de Lotbinière McDougall & Santens, supra note 113, at 9 (stating that 
with the new Rule 37.2, neither party has a veto right regarding amicus submissions); 
see also VanDuzer, supra note 100, at 717. 
119. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 58–60; see also de Lotbinière 
McDougall & Santens, supra note 113, at 6 (reflecting on Rule 37(2)). 
120. Although the requests of NGOs often address several issues, for examples, 
standing as parties, disclosure of materials, and attendance at hearings, this Article 
focuses only on amicus briefs. 
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that manufactured methanol submitted a claim to arbitration 
for injuries resulting from a California order that banned the 
use of MTBE.121 Methanol is an ingredient used to produce the 
gasoline additive MTBE.122 During the arbitral proceedings, the 
US civil society criticized NAFTA because it “provided special 
rights to foreign corporations that allowed special tribunals 
effectively to overrule local environmental regulations through a 
sort of legal ‘backdoor.’”123 Consistent with the Methanex 
approach, some NGOs have requested transparency in this 
process. In January 2001, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal issued a 
Decision on Authority to Accept Amicus Submissions.124 The 
decision proclaimed the tribunal’s authority to accept written 
amicus briefs in investment arbitration for the first time. As the 
arbitration was governed by the UNCITRAL Rules, the tribunal 
considered that its powers to accept amicus submissions “must 
be inferred . . . from its more general procedural powers,” 
meaning, it must be inferred from Article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Rules.125 In its reasoning, the arbitral tribunal on 
the one hand recognized that: “There is undoubtedly public 
interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far 
beyond those raises by the usual transnational arbitration 
between commercial parties . . . . The public interest in this 
arbitration arises from its subject-matter . . . .”126 On the other 
hand, the arbitral tribunal restrictively declared that: 
[A] receipt of written submissions from a person other than 
the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that person 
                                                                                                             
121. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, ¶ 1 (NAFTA Arb. 2005). 
122. Id. 
123. Barton Legum, Introductory Note to Methanex Corporation v. United States of 
America, 44 I.L.M. 1343 (2005) (explaining the Methanex case). 
124. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Petitioner’s Final Submissions 
Regarding the Petition of the International Institute for Sustainable Development to 
the Arbitral Tribunal for Amicus Curiae Status, ¶ 10 (NAFTA Arb. 2000), 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexAmicusStanding
IISDFinal.pdf [hereinafter Methanex, Petitioner’s Submissions]. 
125. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision on Petitions from Third Persons 
to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 25 (NAFTA Arb. 2001), 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionRe
AuthorityAmicus.pdf [hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]. 
126. Id. ¶ 49. Regarding the parties’ suggestions on the public interest in this 
arbitration arising from its subject matter, the petitioners stressed “the critical impact 
that the tribunal’s decision will have on environmental and other public welfare law-
making in the NAFTA region.” Id. ¶ 5. 
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as a party to the arbitration. The rights of the Disputing 
Parties . . . both procedural and substantive, remain 
juridically exactly the same before and after receipt of such 
submissions; and the third person acquires no rights at 
all.127 
Other NAFTA arbitrations, such as United Parcel Service of 
America, Inc. v. Canada, have also decided that Article 15(1) of 
the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules allows amicus curiae submissions.128 
The Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing 
Party Participation has enabled other subsequent arbitral 
tribunals to have rules that are more direct in their support in 
the intervention of amici curiae.129 In Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United 
States, several organizations asked to intervene in a case where 
the Canadian investor considered California’s pro-
environmental regulatory measures to be a NAFTA violation.130 
The arbitral tribunal “decided to accept each submission and 
consider it, as appropriate, in accordance with the principles 
stated in the FTC Statement . . . .”131 Reflecting on the 
consideration given to these allegations by the tribunal, the 
award states: “[T]he tribunal appreciates the thoughtful 
submissions made by a varied group of interested non-parties 
who, in all circumstances, acted with the utmost respect for the 
proceedings and Parties.”132 Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal 
noted that the FTC Statement did not require it to consider the 
submissions.133 In fact, the tribunal did not even “reach the 
particular issues addressed by these submissions.”134 
Subsequent NAFTA cases have also referenced the 
importance of complying with the requirements of the FTC 
                                                                                                             
127. Id. ¶ 30. 
128. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for 
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶ 63 (NAFTA Arb. 2001), 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipation
AmiciCuriae.pdf. 
129. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, supra note 10, at ¶ B(3). 
130. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 11 (NAFTA Arb. 2009), 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-Award.pdf. 
131. See id. ¶ 286. 
132. Id. ¶ 8. 
133. Id. ¶ 286 (“Section (B)(9) of the FTC Statement, which states that 
acceptance of a non-disputing submission does not require the Tribunal to consider 
that submission at any point in the arbitration . . . .”). 
134. Id. ¶ 8. 
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Statement. Specifically, in Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, 
the tribunal declared: “[D]irect your attention to the standards 
for granting leave to file such a submission, which are contained 
in Section B, para. 6 of the Statement, as well as to the 
procedures for submitting and considering the submission, 
contained in Section B, paras. 3–10 of the Statement.”135 
2. Amicus Curiae and ICSID 
The first ICSID case raising the question of the admissibility 
of amicus submissions was Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of 
Bolivia.136 The claimant began an arbitration proceeding 
alleging that Bolivia had violated some provisions of the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.137 The water company could not 
develop its project, as the citizens of the city of Cochabamba 
protested massively against the privatization of the water and 
sewage services and the concession was rescinded.138 When the 
arbitration began, some individuals and environmental NGOs 
filed a petition in order to participate in the proceedings as 
amicus curiae, due to the public interest involved in the 
dispute.139 The court appreciated the initiative140 and claimed to 
have seriously considered it.141 Nevertheless, the tribunal 
concluded that it lacked “the power to join a non-party to the 
proceedings.”142 
Despite this first defeat, NGOs continued to submit amicus 
briefs in ICSID arbitrations. In Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A v. Argentine Republic 
                                                                                                             
135. Email from Eloïse M. Obadia, Senior Counsel, ICSID, to Steven Shrybman, 
Attorney for Canada, 2 (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/
Canada/Merrill/Merrill_Ring-Canada-AmicusDecision.pdf [hereinafter Obadia Email]. 
136. See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 
Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID REV.–
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 450 (2005) [hereinafter Aguas del Tunari]; see also id. at 574 app. 
137. Id. ¶ 3. 
138. See, e.g., id. ¶ 66. 
139. See id. at 574–75 app. 
140. See id. at 575 app. (telling the environmental NGO, Earthjustice, that “[t]he 
Tribunal appreciates that you, and the organizations and individuals with whom you 
work, are concerned with the resolution of this dispute”) 
141. Id. (“The Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it has given serious 
consideration to your request. The briefness of our reply should not be taken as an 
indication that your request was viewed in other than a serious manner.”) 
142. Id. 
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(“Suez”), some European shareholders in a water and sewer 
concession considered that certain Argentine acts and omissions 
constituted a breach of various BIT provisions.143 Basing their 
decision on Article 44 of the Washington Convention, the 
arbitral tribunal declared that it had the power to accept 
nonparty submissions for the first time.144 The tribunal, in order 
to clarify the conditions required to accept amicus briefs, set 
forth the following criteria: “a) the appropriateness of the 
subject matter of the case; b) the suitability of a given nonparty 
to act as amicus curiae in that case, and c) the procedure by 
which the amicus submission is made and considered.”145 
An important question is how to apply these three 
requirements to specific investment cases.146 For instance, in the 
later case, Suez, the same arbitral tribunal considered that: 
It is not enough for a nongovernmental organization to 
justify an amicus submission on general grounds that it 
represents civil society or that it is devoted to humanitarian 
concerns. It must show . . . how its background, 
experience, expertise, or special perspectives will assist the 
Tribunal in the particular case . . . . The Tribunal has 
decided that the four Petitioners have not provided it with 
                                                                                                             
143. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. & Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Aug. 
3, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC518_En&caseId=C19 [hereinafter Suez, 
Decision on Jurisdiction]. 
144. Suez, Amicus Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 2; see Washington Convention, supra 
note 64, art. 44 (“If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this 
Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall 
decide the question.”). 
145. Suez, Amicus Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 2. 
146. See Aguas del Tunari SA v. Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2): 
Introductory Note, 20 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 450, 455 (2005) (summarizing the 
Aguas del Tunari decision on amicus intervention:  
[T]he Tribunal focused on the fact that the dispute centered around water 
services provided to millions of people, and thus may raise a variety of 
complex public and international law questions, including human rights 
considerations. With this in mind, the Tribunal concluded that amicus curiae 
brief would be suitable in this case, as any decision by the Tribunal would 
potentially affect the manner in which water concessions operate and thus 
the vast public they serve. As to the suitability of the Petitioners, the Tribunal 
identified expertise, experience, and independence as the three factors to be 
considered. Finally, with respect to the appropriate procedure, the Tribunal 
declared its goal to enable the amicus to present their views, while 
safeguarding the substantive and procedural rights of the disputing parties). 
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sufficient specific information and reasons to conclude that 
they qualify as amici curiae in this case.147 
In subsequent ICSID arbitrations in which amicus briefs 
were accepted, their admission derived directly from the current 
Rule 37 of the ICSID Rules.148 This rule was successfully invoked 
in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania.149 
This case refers to a water and sewerage infrastructure project 
undertaken by a British-German joint venture in Tanzania.150 
Problems arose between the parties and the investor submitted a 
request for arbitration to ICSID alleging BIT breaches.151 In this 
case, the tribunal “reserved the right (if needed) to ask the 
Petitioners specific questions in relation to their written 
submission, and to request the filing of further written 
submissions and/or documents or other evidence, which might 
assist in better understanding the Petitioners’ position, whether 
before or after the hearing.”152 
Furthermore, in Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El 
Salvador153 and Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold 
Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador,154 both arbitral tribunals 
based the admission of amicus submissions on ICSID Rule 37.2 
                                                                                                             
147. Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A. & InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus 
Curiae, ¶¶ 33–34 (Mar. 17, 2006), 45 I.L.M. 1023 (2006). 
148. See supra Part I.C.4. 
149. See Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 55 (Feb. 2, 2007), 22 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. 
L.J. 217 (2007) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff, Procedural Order No. 5] (“The Arbitral 
Tribunal grants the Petitioners the opportunity to file a written submission in these 
arbitral proceedings, pursuant to Rule 37(2).”). 
150. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 1–3 (July 24, 2008), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC1589_En&caseId=C67 [hereinafter Biwater, Award]. 
151. See id. ¶ 15. 
152. Id. ¶ 65. 
153. ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary 
Objections under CAFTA Articles 10.20.4 and 10.20.5, ¶ 50 (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC1652_En&caseId=C661 [hereinafter Pac Rim, Decision on 
Respondent’s Preliminary Objections]. 
154. ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, ¶ 39 (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC1971_En&caseId=C741. 
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and Article 10.20.3 of the Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement.155 In these cases referring 
to mining exploitation, the arbitral tribunals released a 
procedural order providing details on the characteristics that 
written applications should fulfill.156 Finally, in Piero Foresti v. 
Republic of South Africa, a group of European investors 
considered a South African mining act to have negatively 
affected their mineral rights.157 In this case, following the ICSID 
Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, the petitions for 
participation were accepted158 through the application of Article 
41.3 of these Rules.159 The wording of Article 41(3) is identical 
to that of Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules.160 
                                                                                                             
155. Article 10.20.3 on the Conduct of the Arbitration provides that “[t]he 
tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from 
a person or entity that is not a disputing party.” CAFTA-DR, supra note 95, art. 10.20.3.  
156. Pac Rim, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections, supra note 153, 
¶ 50 (“(1) be emailed to ICSID . . . (2) in no case exceed 20 pages . . . (3) be made in 
one of the languages of these proceedings . . . (5) describe the identity and 
background of the applicant, the nature of any membership if it is an organization and 
the nature of any relationships to the Disputing Parties and any Contracting Party;(6) 
disclose whether the applicant has received, directly or indirectly, any financial or other 
material support from any Disputing Party, Contracting Party or from any person 
connected with the subject-matter of these arbitration proceedings; (7) specify the 
nature of the applicant’s interest in these arbitration proceedings prompting its 
application; . . . [(9) explain] why the Tribunal should grant permission to the 
applicant to file its written submissions in these arbitration proceedings as an amicus 
curiae.”). These requirements, referred to in Pac Rim Cayman LLC, were also 
reproduced, with changed dates, in Commerce Group Corp. See News Release, ICSID, 
Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17), Procedural Order Regarding Amici Curiae (Oct. 20, 
2003), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=
Announcements&pageName=Announcement67. 
157. Piero Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 
¶ 55 (Aug. 4, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1651_En&caseId=C90 [hereinafter Foresti]. 
158. Id. ¶ 9 (“[T]he Parties agreed that Article 41(3) of the Arbitration Rules 
would apply to the filing of written submissions by non-disputing parties (“NDPs”). The 
Parties also agreed to a procedure to be followed by the Parties and the Tribunal with 
respect to any NDP seeking to file written submissions and approaching either Party or 
the Tribunal.”). 
159. ICSID, Additional Facility Rules, art. 41.3, at 62, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp (“After 
consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a party to 
the dispute (in this Article called the “non-disputing party”) to file a written submission 
with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining 
whether to allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the 
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While analyzing some of the decisions of arbitral tribunals, 
it appears that amicus submissions were not especially relevant 
when making a decision.161 Nevertheless, in Piero Foresti the 
arbitral tribunal committed to something positive from the 
perspective of defending the practice of the amici curiae: 
[A]fter all submissions, written and oral, have been made 
the tribunal would invite the parties and the [non-disputing 
parties (“NDP”)] to offer brief comments on the fairness 
and effectiveness of the procedures adopted for NDP 
participation in this case. The tribunal would then include a 
section in the award, recording views (both concordant and 
divergent) on the fairness and efficacy of NDP participation 
in this case and on any lessons learned from it.162 
E. The Future of Amicus Briefs in International Arbitration 
Far from being a resolved issue, the admission of amicus 
curiae is generating broad debate among practitioners, scholars, 
and the parties involved in investment arbitrations. Anticipating 
that the filing of amicus briefs is going to be a universal practice 
in the future, two relevant international organizations have 
recently expressed their desire to create optimal rules for the 
submission of amicus briefs. 
1. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNCITRAL’s mandate is to further the progressive 
harmonization and unification of the law of international 
                                                                                                             
extent to which: (a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a 
perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing 
parties; (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the 
proceeding. The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does 
not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and 
that both parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on the non-
disputing party submission.”). 
160. ICSID Rules, supra note 111, Rule 37(2), at 117. 
161. See this Part I.D.2 (discussing the importance that different arbitral tribunals 
placed on amicus submissions). 
162. Foresti, supra note 157, ¶ 29; see also Elizabeth Whitsitt, An ICSID Tribunal 
Introduces Innovative Steps into Non-Disputing Party Procedure, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, 
Oct. 10, 2009, http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/10/10/an-icsid-tribunal-introduces-
innovative-steps-into-non-disputing-party-procedure. 
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trade.163 The UNCITRAL Working Group II (“Working 
Group”), tasked with arbitration and conciliation, met in Vienna 
in October 2010. The Working Group announced that it 
consider preparing a set of rules of uniform law on transparency 
in treaty-based investor-State dispute settlement.164 One of the 
issues designated by UNCITRAL as a question for possible 
consideration by the Working Group is submissions by third 
parties.165 A reform of the UNCITRAL rules, deemed necessary 
by scholars,166 would require a detailed regulation of the 
institution of amicus curiae.167 
2. International Chamber of Commerce 
The ICC is a business organization that has an arbitration 
mechanism widely used in international practice.168 In March 
2009, the ICC created the Task Force on Arbitration involving 
                                                                                                             
163. Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, U.N COMMISSION ON INT’L 
TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited Jan. 10, 
2012). 
164. U.N. Secretariat, U.N Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Grp. II 
(Arbitration & Conciliation), Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Preparation of Rules of 
Uniform Law on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 53rd Sess., 
Oct. 4–8, 2010, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160/Add.1 (Aug. 5, 2010) 
[hereinafter Working Group II]. 
165. See Ignacio Torterola, The Transparency Requirement in the New UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules: A Premonitory View, INV. TREATY NEWS Q., Sept. 2010, at 8, 10 (noting 
that this set of rules will be finally be created). 
166. See Juanita Olaya, Good Governance and International Investment Law: The 
Challenges of Lack of Transparency and Corruption 43 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. L., Second 
Biennial Global Conference, Working Paper No. 2010/43), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635437&rec=
1&srcabs=1633989; see also Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment 
Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKLEY J. INT’L 
L. 200, 221 (2011) (referring generally to the “need to further formalize the status of 
amicus in investment proceedings”). 
167. See Working Group II, supra note 164, ¶ 21 (stating that the Working Group 
should consider creating specific rules governing third-party submissions that address:  
[P]ossible criteria for acceptance of third parties’ submissions, such as 
assessing the legitimate interest of the third parties, ensuring that they are 
accountable, independent and not backed by any of the disputing parties . . . 
whether the arbitral tribunal should be requested to provide grounds for 
refusal of third parties’ submissions and arguments contained in the 
submissions. . . . [and]the conditions for allowing publicity of the amicus 
curiae briefs). 
168. See What Is ICC?, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM. WORLD BUS. ORG., 
http://www.iccwbo.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
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states or state entities.169 The 150-member task force was 
commissioned to determine whether the ICC arbitration 
proceedings should be modified to some extent, given the 
peculiarities of these mixed-nature controversies.170 
Amicus submissions are common in various jurisdictions. 
Similarly, amicus briefs may be filed before various international 
tribunals. In the field of international investment arbitration, 
amicus submissions are controversial. Several reasons exist both 
for and against the institution of amicus submissions. 
II. THE DEBATE ON ACCEPTING AMICUS BRIEFS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
The admission of amicus briefs in investment arbitration is 
a controversial issue.171 Most papers on this subject reflect the 
position of interest groups and, therefore, wish to strengthen 
the recourse to this institution. However, the amicus submissions 
raise greater concerns for the investors initiating international 
arbitration proceedings and their practitioners. This Part details 
the arguments for and against the institution of amicus curiae in 
international investment arbitration.172 
A. Benefits of Accepting Amicus Briefs 
Nonprofit legal advocacy organizations highlight several 
positive aspects of amicus curiae. This Section details these 
aspects. 
1. Public Interest Protection 
Amicus submissions aim to protect important public 
interests such as environmental and health protection, human 
rights, workers’ rights, sustainable development, cultural 
                                                                                                             
169. See Task Force on Arbitration Involving States or State Entities, INT’L CHAMBER OF 
COM. WORLD BUS. ORG., http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/arbitration/id32956/
index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
170. See id. (recounting the International Chamber of Commerce Task Force on 
Arbitration’s mandate). 
171. See, e.g., Asteriti & Tams, supra note 80, at 3 (alluding to a potential “pitched 
battle between proponents of greater transparency and inclusiveness and defenders of 
privacy and confidentiality”). 
172. Some of these arguments are also taken into account when assessing the 
amicus submissions in the judicial sphere. See Schachter, supra note 26, at 119–36. 
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heritage, the fight against corruption, and governmental 
policies.173 The significance of these public interests emphasizes 
the benefits of bringing them to the attention of arbitrators 
through the amicus submissions.174 Although the various rules 
governing investment arbitration require qualified arbitrators, 
this does not mean that arbitrators have to be able to know all 
the aspects of a case per se.175 Along with the ruling of the 
arbitral tribunal in the Suez case, recent statements of the 
nondisputing parties in the Piero Foresti case are also relevant to 
show the protective goal of these amicus submissions: 
[T]his arbitration raises issues of obvious public 
importance, including substantive equality and other 
human rights, environmental protection, sustainable 
development, and the respective roles of governments and 
investors in pursuing these goals. The consistency of South 
Africa’s domestic constitutional obligations and its 
obligations arising out of international human rights law, on 
the one hand, and international investment treaties, on the 
other, has direct relevance to each of the Petitioners’ 
mandates and activities at the local, national and 
international levels. The interest of the Petitioners in all of 
these public concerns is longstanding, genuine and 
supported by their well- recognised expertise in these 
areas.176 
                                                                                                             
173. See CAMILLA GRAHAM, ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV., A “HOW TO” GUIDE TO 
AMICUS CURIAE & INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 6–7, available at 
http://a4id.co.uk/content/amicus-curiae-+-international-investment-arbitrations.pdf 
(citing several issues that can be affected by investment arbitration). 
174. See Choudhury, supra note 82, at 827 (highlighting the importance of this 
“public interest”); see also Mary E. Footer, BITs and Pieces: Social and Environmental 
Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 33, 46–47 
(2009). 
175. See, e.g., Washington Convention, supra note 64, art. 14 (“Persons designated 
to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied 
upon to exercise independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of 
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.”). 
176. Brief for Centre for Applied Legal Studies et al., Petition for Limited 
Participation as Non-Disputing Parties in Terms of Articles 41(3), 27, 39, and 35 of the 
Additional Facilities Rules, ¶ 4.18, Piero Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/1, available at http://www.lrc.org.za/case-related/1012-2009-07-17-piero-
foresti-a-others-v-rsa-petition-for-limited-participation-as-non-disputing-parties-icsid 
(follow “Click to download” hyperlink). 
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2. Improvement of the Quality of the Award 
Sometimes the state is not able to bring all relevant aspects 
of the controversy to the arbitrators’ attention.177 This situation 
might be due to several factors. For example, the state might 
have no knowledge or evidence on some issues, or the state 
might lack resources or expertise to properly develop a global 
defense.178 Under these circumstances, amicus submissions offer 
useful additional perspectives, factual, legal, and technical, to 
the arbitral tribunal. Thus, the contributions made by the 
amicus curiae enhance the quality of the award. This benefits 
the parties involved in the case, as well as the general interests 
that may be affected by the arbitral decision.179 In the Suez case, 
the tribunal affirmed that, “[g]iven the public interest in the 
subject matter of this case, it is possible that appropriate 
nonparties may be able to afford the Tribunal perspectives, 
arguments, and expertise that will help it arrive at a correct 
decision.”180 
In Biwater, the arbitral tribunal recognized that the 
petitioners “approach[ed] the issues in this case with interests, 
expertise and perspectives that have been demonstrated to 
materially differ from those of the two contending parties, and 
as such have provided a useful contribution to these 
proceedings.”181 
3. Increase in Transparency 
The intervention of amicus curiae also benefits the 
institutional sphere. The increased transparency achieved by the 
submissions gives greater credibility to the mechanism of 
international investment arbitration itself and makes a 
                                                                                                             
177. See Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision, supra note 125, ¶ 10 (noting that 
Canada has “stated its support for greater openness in arbitration proceedings”). 
178. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 59–60; see also Levine, supra note 
166, at 217–18 (highlighting the problems that the host state has to face). 
179. See Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency 
and Public Participation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 345 
(2009) (analyzing these benefits); see also Levine, supra note 166, at 217–19 (discussing 
the benefits of amicus participation in investment disputes). 
180. Suez, Amicus Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 21. 
181. Biwater, Award, supra note 150, ¶ 359. 
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contribution toward its future consolidation and prevalence.182 
Therefore, amicus briefs are a resource to combat the legitimacy 
crisis that threatens investment arbitration.183 In Methanex, the 
petitioner: 
[D]rew the Tribunal’s attention to the advantage that would 
accrue from granting the Petitioner amicus status in helping 
to remedy the public perception of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 
process as closed, secretive, non-transparent and one-sided, 
as well as being not disposed to take account of the 
environmental issues at stake in the cases brought under it. 
The Petitioner argued that the need to remedy that 
perception has been rendered more acute by the Metalclad 
decision, and that a properly established process for the 
amicus status will enhance the public acceptability of any 
ultimate decision of this Tribunal . . . .184 
In Biwater, the arbitral tribunal stated that: “[T]he 
Petitioners emphasise the importance of public access to the 
arbitration from the perspective of the credibility of the 
arbitration process itself in the eyes of the public, which often 
considers investor-state arbitration as a system unfolding in a 
secret environment that is anathema in a democratic context.”185 
4. Amicus Briefs as a Starting Point for Implementing the Public 
Interest in Investment Arbitration 
Arbitral tribunals should also support the additional 
requests that petitions for participation as nondisputing parties 
usually include:186 permission to attend and present the amicus’s 
                                                                                                             
182. See Amokura Kawharu, Public Participation & Transparency in Investment 
Arbitration: Recent Developments and Future Challenges, ANU COLLEGE OF Law, 2–3, 
http://law.anu.edu.au/cipl/Conferences&SawerLecture/2007/ANZSIL%202007/
Publications/Amicus%20Notes%2006.07_Amokura.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012); see 
also Levine, supra note 166, at 21 (highlighting the benefits of amicus submissions). 
183. See generally Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) (reflecting on the contemporary problems facing 
arbitration); see also Levine, supra note 166, at 21. 
184. Methanex, Petitioner’s Submissions, supra note 124, ¶ 10. 
185. Biwater Gauff, Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 149, ¶ 34. 
186. Analyzing the investment arbitration cases in which third parties have sought 
to intervene, it appears that such third parties normally submit two documents: a 
petition for participation as non-disputing party—a request that lists all the orders 
sought—and the submission of the amicus brief itself. For further discussion see 
Eugenia Levine, supra note 166, at 222 (“The tribunal should also be empowered with 
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key submissions at the oral hearings when they take place, or as 
an alternative, attend the oral hearings as observers or to reply 
to any specific questions of the tribunal on the written 
submissions; and access to the key arbitration documents that 
are relevant to the concerns of the amicus.187 To protect the 
public interest, it is necessary to maximally implement the 
principle of transparency in the field of international investment 
arbitration. In United Parcel Service v. Canada, both amicus 
petitioners, in arguing for access to arbitration documents, 
stated that: “[T]hey are prejudiced in being able to describe the 
full nature of their interests and potential contribution by not 
knowing the Investor’s particular claims and the arguments it 
has brought forward.”188 In the field of ICSID, there has been 
recent progress applauded by amicus petitioners.189 The tribunal 
in Piero Foresti has allowed “access to those papers submitted to 
the Tribunal by the Parties that are necessary to enable the 
[nondisputing parties] to focus their submissions upon the 
issues arising in the case and to see what positions the Parties 
have taken on those issues.”190 
5. Positive Effects of Public Scrutiny on the Future of the 
Investment System 
The entire process of writing and submitting amicus briefs 
is an incentive to attract media interest and influence public 
debate on these public-interest topics.191 In Biwater, the arbitral 
tribunal itself recognized that “the dispute was a very public and 
                                                                                                             
a structured discretion to allow for different forms of amicus participation: (a) 
submission of written briefs; (b) attendance at hearings, and potentially the making of 
oral arguments; and (c) access to some or all of the documents on the record.”). 
187. See, for example, the still-unpublished letter of Chevron Corp. & Texaco 
Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Petition for Participation as 
Non-Disputing Parties, ¶ 1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2011/petition_amicus_chevron_ecuador.pdf (requesting that the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration tribunal allow the petitioners, two NGOs, to submit a written brief, present 
their submission at oral argument, and access “key arbitration documents”). 
188. United Parcel Service, Decision on Amicus Curiae, supra note 79, ¶ 47. 
189. See, e.g., Whitsitt, supra note 162 (stating that ICSID “imposed 
unprecedented procedural steps regarding document disclosure and participant 
feedback”). 
190. Obadia Email, supra note 135, at 1. 
191. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 173, at 6, 10. 
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widely reported one.”192 An amicus brief can therefore have a 
long-term educational impact or even be an influence for 
significant changes in the future, such as a national legislative 
modification or the establishment of an international 
instrument to regulate a particularly sensitive issue.193 In this 
sense, it should be noted that the public is demanding a much 
more active role throughout the whole process of international 
investment. The Public Statement on the International 
Investment Regime issued on August 31, 2010, claims that: 
Private citizens, local communities and civil society 
organizations should be afforded a right to participate in 
decision-making that affects their rights and interests, 
including in the context of investor-state dispute settlement 
or contract renegotiation. The international investment 
regime, by not allowing for full and equal participation of 
such parties alongside the investor where their interests are 
affected, fails to satisfy this basic requirement of procedural 
fairness.194 
B. Concerns on the Admission of Amicus Briefs 
This Section presents some of the negative aspects of the 
amicus curiae submissions, especially those highlighted by 
investors, law firms supporting investors in international 
investment arbitration, and host states. The confluence of these 
arguments could reduce the willingness of the parties involved 
in international investment to go to arbitration. 
                                                                                                             
192. Biwater, Award, supra note 150, ¶ 67. 
193. See Levine, supra note 166, at 217–19; see also Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, 
supra note 179, at 351–52 (stating that transparency can be a tool to achieve systemic 
improvements in different areas of law). 
194. PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME ¶ 9 (2010), 
available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%
20Statement%20%28June%202011%29.pdf. This statement of concern about the 
international investment regime is supported by a series of academics with expertise in 
investment law. See id. 
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1. Amicus Curiae is not a Universally Recognized Institution 
Importantly, some national legal systems do not recognize 
the institution of amicus curiae.195 In the NAFTA case United 
Parcel Service, Mexico claimed to be 
concerned that concepts or procedures that are alien to its 
legal tradition and which are not agreed to as part of [the 
FTC Statement] may be imported into NAFTA dispute 
settlement proceedings involving other NAFTA parties and 
then set a precedent for future cases where Mexico is the 
disputing Party.196 
This could lead one to argue that it is wrong to generally 
impose on states this institution in the field of investment 
arbitration, as it “may be seen as representing a victory of the 
common law over the civil law.”197 
2. Disregard for the Consensual Nature of Arbitration 
An essential feature of arbitration, which is highly valued by 
the parties, is its consensual nature. Therefore, if parties, or at 
least one of them, do not accept amicus briefs, one can argue 
that arbitrators should not be able to authorize the intervention 
of these nonparties.198 Consequently, in the absence of a rule 
that stating otherwise, the ICSID arbitral tribunal in Aguas del 
Tunari communicated to the amicus petitioners that: 
Your core requests are beyond the power or the authority of 
the Tribunal to grant. The interplay of the two treaties 
involved . . . and the consensual nature of arbitration 
places the control of the issues you raise with the parties, 
not the Tribunal. In particular, it is manifestly clear to the 
                                                                                                             
195. See Coe, Jr., supra note 78, at 1362. See generally Asteriti & Tams, supra note 80 
(offering an interesting study on comparative law among common law and civil law 
countries). 
196. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Mexico’s 1128 Submission on the 
Amicus Petitions, ¶ 5 (NAFTA Arb. 2001), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/
Canada/UPS/UPSMexico1128ReAmicusSub.pdf. Note that this allegation was made 
when NAFTA courts applied Article 15 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This 
argument lost strength once the referred 2003 NAFTA Statement was approved. 
197. See Bjorklund, supra note 51, at 1293 (reflecting on this conflict among 
different legal systems). 
198. See, e.g., Sabater, supra note 73, at 50–51 (proclaiming that “imposing limits 
on the opportunities for third parties to intervene in any given arbitration is nothing 
but enforcing the parties’ original dispute resolution agreement”). 
550 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:510 
Tribunal that it does not, absent the agreement of the 
Parties, have the power to join a non-party to the 
proceedings.199 
3. No Need for Amicus Briefs 
The rules governing investment arbitrations already offer 
enough options to both parties and the judge to gather 
information needed to resolve the case. Taking the example of 
the ICSID Rules, Rule 33 regulates the organization of 
evidence,200 and Rule 34 gives a very active role to the tribunal 
regarding the evidence.201 Referring to NAFTA arbitrations, the 
investor in United Parcel Service argued that “amicus briefs should 
only be submitted in the event that the Tribunal determines the 
disputing parties are unable to provide the necessary assistance 
and materials needed to decide the dispute.”202 Therefore, 
amicus interventions are not always considered necessary to 
provide a new perspective on the case. 
4. Interference with Parties’ Strategy 
Amicus curiae interventions may affect the parties’ strategy. 
Parties are sometimes unwilling203 to reveal all the information 
related to the case because they may be suffering from political 
pressure, or they might believe that the disclosure will be 
counterproductive to their interests.204 Amicus briefs, therefore, 
                                                                                                             
199. Aguas del Tunari, supra note 136, ¶ 17. 
200. See ICSID Rules, supra note 111, Rule 33 (“Without prejudice to the rules 
concerning the production of documents, each party shall, within time limits fixed by 
the Tribunal, communicate to the Secretary-General, for transmission to the Tribunal 
and the other party, precise information regarding the evidence which it intends to 
produce and that which it intends to request the Tribunal to call for, together with an 
indication of the points to which such evidence will be directed.”). 
201. Id. Rule 34 (allowing the tribunal to admit any evidence and weigh its 
probative value; call upon parties to produce documents, witnesses, or experts; visit any 
place connected with the dispute; and note any failure by the parties to comply with the 
tribunal’s evidentiary requests). 
202. United Parcel Service of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Investor’s Response to the 
Petition of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, ¶ 17 
(NAFTA Arb. 2001), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPS
InvestorSubReAmicus.pdf. 
203. See supra Part II.A.2. 
204. See Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
59 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 373, 393 (2010); see also Levine, supra note 166, at 21 
(explaining potential interferences with parties’ strategies). 
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can negatively affect the parties’ degree of autonomy and 
control over their arbitration. 
5. Unilateral Positioning 
Investors complain that, as amicus briefs mostly support the 
state’s approach,205 the court may be pressured to accept these 
arguments and thus prioritize the state’s position.206 This risk 
has been expressly indicated by the arbitral tribunal in Methanex: 
[A]s appears from the Petitions, any amicus submissions 
from these Petitioners are more likely to run counter to the 
Claimant’s position and eventually to support the 
Respondent’s case. This factor has weighed heavily with the 
Tribunal; and it is concerned that the Claimant should 
receive whatever procedural protection might be 
necessary.207 
6. Harmful Positioning 
Some scholars allege that amicus briefs, especially if they 
are unsolicited, do not provide added value.208 Amicus curiae 
have been criticized for merely repeating the state’s arguments, 
which has occasionally led to complaints that the intervening 
NGOs are biased.209 Sometimes even developing countries, 
which theoretically benefit from these submissions, are wary of 
NGOs submitting amicus briefs.210 Because NGOs from 
developed countries have the economic resources, required 
specialists, and requisite experience, they often drive the 
drafting of these briefs.211 Therefore, the respondent state and 
its citizens may consider the amicus curiae as not adequately 
reflecting all the nuances of the social problems that often exist 
                                                                                                             
205. See GRAHAM, supra note 173, at 11 (stating that amicus submissions often 
reflect perspective); see also Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 179, at 355. 
206. See, e.g., Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 179, at 355; see also 
Mackenzie, supra note 33, at 299 (highlighting potential risk of prejudice due to the 
volume of briefs in support of the opposing party’s position). 
207. Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision, supra note 125, ¶ 50. 
208. See, e.g., Mackenzie, supra note 33, at 299 (reflecting on the value of amicus 
submissions). 
209. See Bjorklund, supra note 51, at 1292–93 (reflecting on the impartiality of 
amicus briefs). 
210. See id. 
211. See id. 
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behind these international investment arbitrations,212 and that 
amicus briefs constitute an “uninvited interference with affairs 
in the developing world.”213 
7. Costs and Delays to the Parties 
Amicus involvement increases arbitration costs and 
generates delays, both of which are ultimately borne by the 
parties. Therefore, amicus briefs have damaging effects on the 
parties to a dispute in terms of time, resources, and increased 
submissions that leave investment arbitration with some of the 
same criticisms that can be directed towards the judicial 
system.214 These submissions can also create a paradoxical 
situation where they are detrimental to the citizens of the 
respondent state whose interests the amicus briefs try to 
defend.215 Moreover, these problems of time and expense 
increase if the applicable arbitration rules allow parties to make 
submissions on the petitions filed by the amici. The following 
statements of the investor in Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. 
Canada are very clear in this regard: 
Care must also be taken to ensure that amicus submissions 
are not received without sound reason to believe that they 
will usefully assist the Tribunal. If a tribunal were to permit 
amicus briefs liberally, then the proceedings would quickly 
become unmanageable . . . . That would be unfair and 
costly to the disputing parties, who would be called upon to 
                                                                                                             
212. This argument has been raised by several developing countries within the 
WTO. It has been stated that amicus submissions may put “the developing countries at 
an even greater disadvantage in view of the relative unpreparedness of their NGOs who 
had much less resources and wherewithal either to send briefs without being solicited 
or to respond to invitations for sending such briefs.” World Trade Organization 
General Council, Minutes of Meeting of 22 November 2000, ¶ 38, WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23, 
2001). 
213. Bjorklund, supra note 51, at 1292. 
214. See Levine, supra note 166, at 24 (pointing out that “there is a risk that 
opening up the process in this manner would result in the arbitration procedure 
becoming ‘court-like’ and losing the attributes of more cost-efficient and speedy 
adjudication that is perceived as a significant advantage”); see also Sabater, supra note 
73, at 51 (noting that delays, complexities, and publicity is exactly what parties tried to 
avoid by submitting themselves to arbitration). 
215. See Asteriti & Tams, supra note 80, at 5–6 (explaining the potentially 
detrimental effects on the State of investment arbitration proceedings). 
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respond to potentially voluminous material, none of which 
would be received on the basis of their consent.216 
Additionally, the submission of amicus briefs also affects the 
workload of the arbitral tribunal and it is a new expense that is 
borne by the parties.217 It should be noted that speed and 
economy are two of arbitration’s main characteristics, which 
lead the parties to prefer this mechanism rather than going 
through the courts.218 The negative effects of the amicus briefs 
might influence investors and make them rethink their choice. 
8. Risks to Confidentiality 
Amicus briefs ask for greater transparency in the whole 
arbitration process, and they usually request additional rights, 
such as access to documents and hearings.219 The acceptance of 
these requirements, which generally has not happened so far, 
would be detrimental to investors who would have to suffer the 
negative consequences of the diffusion of confidential 
information, such as adverse publicity or the loss of future 
business.220 In Methanex, the investor stated the following 
regarding this sensitive information: 
Under Article 25.4 of the UNCITRAL Rules, hearings shall 
be held “in camera” unless the parties agree otherwise . . . 
. At common-law, the requirement that arbitration be held 
in camera carries with it the implied term that the 
documents created for the purpose of that hearing are also 
private and confidential. The disclosure to a third party of 
such documents would be almost equivalent to opening the 
door of the arbitration room to that third party. . . . The 
parties negotiated at some length and ultimately came to an 
agreement respecting the terms of a Confidentiality Order 
in the form delivered to the Tribunal by joint submission 
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dated August 23, 2000 . . . . Nowhere in the order do the 
parties permit disclosure to non-governmental organizations 
or public interest groups. Further, the parties did not agree 
in the Confidentiality Order to waive or amend the 
provisions of Article 25.4 of the UNCITRAL Rules, requiring 
the hearings to be held in camera.221 
The various reasons set out above for and against the 
acceptance of amicus briefs in the field of investment arbitration 
lead to reflection on which should be the future treatment to be 
given to amicus curiae. 
III. DRAWING A LINE BETWEEN “FRIENDS OF THE COURT” 
AND “FALSE FRIENDS” 
As discussed in the preceding Parts, the current NAFTA 
and ICSID regulations have allowed the submission of amicus 
briefs in some major investment arbitration cases.222 The 
abundant references found in treaties, laws, and investment 
contracts to ICSID seems to indicate that many future requests 
for amicus curiae will continue to be made through the 
mechanism established by this international organization. 
However, ICSID has been widely questioned in recent times 
and some countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have even 
denounced the Washington Convention and left the 
organization.223 This recent situation foretells that other 
alternative channels will be used to submit future requests for 
amicus briefs. In this regard, two recent initiatives cited in this 
Article are relevant: the UNCITRAL Working Group II aiming 
to create a set of rules of uniform law on transparency in treaty-
based, investor-state dispute settlement, and the ICC Task Force 
on Arbitration involving states or state entities, which will 
probably address the issue of transparency.224 It seems that both 
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institutions are aware that in the near future, they will gain 
relevance in the field of international investment arbitration, 
and that the intervention of nonparties in this sector often raises 
issues requiring individual regulation. 
This Part presents a series of proposals in order to 
predetermine what should be the most adequate future praxis 
for the admission of amicus briefs. These proposals are useful 
not only in determining how the general and imprecise 
parameters contained in ICSID Rule 37.2 should be better 
applied—or even amended—in future ICSID cases, but they also 
provide guidelines regarding the UNCITRAL and ICC 
preliminary works. These suggested criteria should allow 
arbitrators to distinguish among different types of amicus briefs, 
and encourage acceptance of these nonparty interventions only 
if their effects are beneficial to all the interests involved in the 
international dispute. Additionally, in certain cases, the creation 
of an institution that permanently takes into account the 
interests otherwise protected through amicus briefs should be 
encouraged. 
A. Improving the Current Standards of Amicus Brief Submission 
The first way to draw a line between the various types of 
amicus briefs that can be submitted in investment arbitration is 
to create a detailed set of additional guidelines to properly filter 
these requests. To create these new guidelines, the various rules 
set out in Sections I.B and I.C.3 of this Article were discussed. 
Based on an analysis of all those provisions and on the 
discussion in Part II, some of the remarkable factors that might 
be weighed to create these additional guidelines are indicated 
below. Additionally, this Part reflects on an appropriate answer 
for all these issues. The goal of this Part is to propose the 
contents of the provision that an arbitral tribunal should apply 
when determining whether to accept an amicus submission. The 
application of this provision should not depend on the 
tribunal’s discretion, as is the case with NAFTA, but rather 
should be mandatory, provided that the constituent guidelines 
reflect minimum flexibility. The mandatory application of this 
provision is, of course, not synonymous with the mandatory 
acceptance of the submission. 
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1. Amicus’ Identity 
Taking into account the practice of both national and 
international courts and international arbitral tribunals referred 
to throughout this Article, the identity of the amici curiae may 
be extremely varied. Amicus briefs submitted by states, NGOs, 
professional associations, trade unions, private companies, 
scholars, law school clinics, law firms, and individuals have been 
accepted. Sometimes, amici curiae represent a large group of 
people with a common interest, and, on other occasions, the 
amicus briefs are presented individually.225 The singularity or 
plurality of the petitioner is not the only essential factor to give 
greater or lesser relevance to the submission. Additional 
important facts to consider are, for example, the connection 
between the activities of the amicus and the circumstances of the 
case and, moreover, the amicus’ real representativeness—the 
one that goes beyond the quantitative data. Consequently, it 
does not seem appropriate, as the Statute and Rules of the 
International Court of Justice establishes,226 to set an ex ante 
provision limiting the typology of subjects allowed to submit 
amicus briefs. International investments and the perspectives 
advocated by the amici curiae may be so diverse that there 
should be ample personal legitimation in this field of nonparty 
intervention. Scholars have also suggested the establishment of 
different levels of participation among the amici, taking into 
account their respective level of interest in the case.227 This 
proposal, although suggestive, would pose difficulties in 
implementation. 
2. No Requirement for a Specific Drafter’s Expertise 
National courts accepting amicus briefs sometimes require 
them to be submitted by an attorney admitted to practice before 
that court.228 Taking into account the characteristics of 
international investment arbitration—that is, conducted before 
ad hoc tribunals or international organizations that do not 
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require the admission to a specific bar—this strict exigency 
cannot be reproduced in this sphere. It is not necessary that the 
drafter be a practitioner. Given the wide range of interests that 
can be defended through amicus submissions, these briefs will 
not always develop legal principles. It is advisable that, taking 
into account the characteristics of the arguments to be 
developed, a suitable person should be elected to draft this 
brief. It should be noted that the degree of credibility and 
relevance granted by the court to the amicus brief would 
possibly depend on its quality. 
3. Proof of Economic Independence from the Parties 
As amici curiae sometimes have been accused of partiality, 
the test of economic independence is important to dispel such 
doubts. Frequently, NGOs domiciled in the state where the 
investment was made submit amicus briefs to the arbitral 
tribunal. In these cases, it is especially important to demonstrate 
that the NGO does not receive subsidies or other financial 
support that could affect their impartiality. Another question to 
be determined is to what extent the submission of amicus briefs 
should be prevented from those who are connected in some way 
to lawyers, witnesses, judges, or staff working on the 
arbitration.229 It should be noted that the field of international 
investment arbitration is very specialized. There are a limited 
number of arbitrators and law firms working in this area and, 
therefore, the connections between people involved in these 
conflicts are more common than what otherwise might be 
thought. 
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4. Conclusive Evidence of Legitimate and Significant Interest in 
the Petitioners 
The notion of interest is extremely difficult to define.230 
Similarly, it is very complicated to establish the appropriate 
standard of interest for these cases of amicus submissions in 
investment arbitration. An interest that is legitimate, significant, 
and able to be conclusively demonstrated should be represented 
at the arbitration. This does not mean that the investment has to 
be financially harmful to the NGO. It is enough to prove that 
the purpose for which the NGO was created is negatively 
affected by cases such as the one that gave rise to the 
controversial arbitration. 
Another issue to consider is that amicus submissions are 
intended to pursue the protection of collective interests that 
belong to the basic core of every society. Therefore, 
organizations must avoid the temptation to resort to this 
institution to make other kinds of claims, such as political ones, 
or to gain popularity. 
5. Public Interest in the Subject Matter of the Arbitration 
The requirement of public interest to be a subject matter of 
the arbitration is neither expressly included in Article 37.2 of 
the ICSID Rules,231 nor has it been added in the procedural 
orders that ICSID have issued in its last investment arbitration 
cases, which provide detailed guidelines on the written 
applications.232 Nevertheless, BITs, such as the Canadian-Slovak 
BIT,233 do indicate that one of the issues the court must consider 
is if there is a public interest in the subject matter of the 
arbitration. This second option is preferable because, as stated 
above,234 the intervention of the civil society in the area of 
investment arbitration has to be justified by the peculiarities of a 
case that exceed the interests of specific parties. In addition, the 
application of this filter could banish baseless submissions that 
would only constitute a burden to the arbitral process. 
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6. Novel Contribution 
The amicus brief must identify its added value. If the 
amicus brief is only offering overlapping arguments, it should 
not be admitted. As the one the basic rule to follow, it seems 
nevertheless very difficult for the entire text of the amicus brief 
to offer novel contributions. Therefore, a parameter to 
determine the required degree of novelty in the submissions 
should be established. This degree may be established by 
including an adverb before the adjective, such as “sufficiently” 
or “mostly novel” contribution, in the procedural rule 
governing the amicus submissions and by allowing the arbitral 
tribunal to apply this rule while taking into account the 
characteristics of each case. Depending on the nature of the 
NGO submitting the amicus brief, it is estimated that the novelty 
test could be successfully overcome by providing either novel 
legal or factual arguments in the amicus briefs. As will be 
exposed, the option of submitting joint briefs facilitates the 
possibility of the amicus brief meeting this standard. Finally, it 
can be argued that an NGO does not know whether it will 
overcome this test of novelty if it does not have access to the 
documents submitted by the parties. However, it seems that this 
argument is losing relevance now. It is increasingly common for 
at least one of the parties to make its arbitration documents 
accessible online. 
7. Other Procedural Limits Regarding the Submission of Amicus 
Briefs 
In order to resolve potential overlaps among concurrent 
amici curiae, procedural rules should encourage potential amici 
to coordinate efforts and to submit consensus documents that 
comply in the best possible way with these requirements. As will 
be presented below, a joint brief with a maximum 
predetermined length is a good tool to keep this nonparty 
intervention manageable for the arbitral tribunal. A temporal 
limit on the submission is also necessary to avoid slowing down 
the whole arbitration process. 
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8. Cost Assumption 
In general, there is no information on how high the costs 
arising from the preparation and submission of amicus briefs 
are. While sometimes the drafting of amicus briefs is part of the 
work of the NGO’s staff, other briefs are wholly or partially 
drafted by outside counsel who do not work pro bono. Differing 
from the requirement to prove that the NGO is not 
economically dependent on the parties, it would also be 
beneficial to impose upon NGOs the duty of revealing the cost 
of the amicus submission and the funding source of the 
expense. On the other hand, investors and states are currently 
bearing the costs derived from the time that arbitrators and 
lawyers devote to analyze or respond to the amicus briefs. The 
optimal solution to avoid this outcome is to avoid passing these 
costs to the NGOs that have the submitted the briefs, as this 
option could stop the presentation of valuable contributions. A 
better possibility would be to create some kind of fund that 
covers the internal and external expenses arising from the 
intervention of amici curiae in investment arbitrations.235 
9. No Veto Right of the Parties 
The issues addressed by amicus briefs are so essential that 
their allegations should not be made dependent on the parties’ 
acceptance. In this sense, the approach contended in Rule 37 of 
the ICSID Rules is appropriate. Nevertheless, the inability of the 
parties to prevent arbitral tribunals from accepting amicus briefs 
does not imply that the parties do not have to be protected from 
certain effects that these submissions may generate. 
10. Party Protection to Minimize the Adverse Aspects of Amicus 
Submissions 
If amicus briefs are accepted, parties should be given the 
opportunity to respond to these submissions. Party response 
should not depend on the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. 
The rules have to set out a reasonable deadline by which states 
and investors may submit their responses on the amicus briefs to 
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the tribunal. On the other hand, a balance should also be 
struck, so that these deadlines should not lengthen the 
arbitration. 
11. Duties of the Arbitral Tribunal Regarding Amicus Briefs 
The arbitral tribunal should grant to parties and nonparties 
a number of procedural guarantees. For instance, once the 
tribunal has decided the phase in the proceedings when such 
submissions may be made and has imposed deadlines and 
length limits for the submission of the amicus briefs, the arbitral 
tribunal should respond to the amicus submission within a 
reasonable time and offer the amici curiae sufficient reasoning 
for the acceptance or rejection of their requests. In addition, if 
the amicus brief is accepted, the arbitral tribunal must commit 
itself to consider in detail these submissions and include 
approving or disapproving references to the amicus briefs’ 
content in the final award. This option is the best way for the 
whole process of third-party intervention to enjoy the highest 
possible degree of predictability, transparency, and consensus. 
12. Powers of the Arbitral Tribunal Regarding Amicus Briefs 
The general rules governing the procedure of the 
investment arbitration or the specific provisions relating to 
amicus briefs should provide the arbitral tribunal with sufficient 
margin to act. It is beneficial if the tribunal, as happened in the 
Biwater case,236 reserves the right to question the amicus or to 
demand further information regarding the amicus brief’s 
content. As will be seen in the following Section,237 if this 
proposition is carried out to its final consequences, it can 
generate substantial changes in the current scheme of 
investment arbitration. Additionally, if parties are authorized to 
access key documents provided by the parties to the arbitration, 
the court should have the power to impose some limits on 
amicus briefs in this regard. For example, the tribunal may 
order the NGO not to publish the amicus brief alluding to these 
key documents until at least the end of the arbitration. 
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B. Developing More Stable Ways to Protect the Public Interest in 
International Investment Arbitration 
This Article considers the establishment of additional 
requirements as an appropriate solution to prevent the 
indiscriminate filing of amicus briefs in investment arbitration. 
This option is particularly ideal in relation to rules such as the 
UNCITRAL Rules, which are sometimes applied by ad hoc 
tribunals that do not have a permanent institutional support. 
On the other hand, if the arbitration is hosted by an 
international organization such as ICSID or the ICC, which does 
have a permanent administrative structure, the option of 
refining filters is also adequate. Nevertheless, this Article 
questions whether, in these cases, it would be preferable to 
create a structure that protects the public interests in a more 
predictable and stable fashion. 
Two alternative and more radical systemic changes 
regarding amicus submissions may also be envisioned in 
investment arbitrations. On one hand, amicus interventions 
could be based on the WTO model, which implies that the 
arbitrators would request the amicus curiae submissions. Thus, 
the arbitral tribunal would decide which submissions might be 
of interest for the case and therefore not admit unrequested 
amicus briefs.238 This system has some advantages. For example, 
in recent ICSID cases there have been no amicus submissions, 
although the court has offered such a possibility through a 
procedural order.239 Applying this alternative system, the lack of 
participation of NGOs can be supplemented by a proactive 
positioning of the court. Besides that, the arbitrators would 
make much more targeted requests, avoiding requests which are 
redundant or too generic. Analyzing this system from the 
opposite perspective, its implementation could generate a 
dangerous situation of helplessness. The public interest would 
not be taken into account if, due to a lack of information or 
awareness, the court did not make any or enough amicus 
requests. 
On the other hand, arbitral institutions such as ICSID or 
the ICC could establish within its structure a permanent 
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institution devoted to the protection of the general interest. Part 
I.B.2 of this Article refers to such institutions, such as the 
Commissioner of Human Rights or the prosecutor in 
international criminal matters. These institutions—and others 
such as the Ombudsman and the UN special rapporteur—come 
from different areas of law that are removed from investment 
arbitration, and thus their contributions to the investment area 
should be accepted very cautiously. Given this caveat, the newly 
defined functions of these persons should include the 
responsibility of investigating the general interests affected by 
each investment arbitration and presenting, if any, this novel 
protective perspective to the arbitral tribunal. This system would 
benefit from the stability and professionalism acquired by the 
new institution over time. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this institution 
requires that many obstacles be overcome, such as the financing 
side or the reluctance of the traditional participants in 
investment arbitration. The operation of this new institution 
would also require intensive work of clarification in matters such 
as the specific powers of this new institution and its interaction 
with the arbitral tribunal, parties, and NGOs. This would be a 
fundamental reform, undoubtedly requiring political will and 
due time to become reality. Such reforms, if enacted, would be 
beneficial to the public interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The intervention of amicus curiae in investment arbitration 
is a matter of great interest that will continue to generate legal 
debate. In the wake of multiple courts’ and some tribunals’ 
decision to admit amicus curiae submissions, several rules on 
investment arbitration have increasingly recognized the 
possibility that the general interest is protected through amicus 
submissions. The fact that a party to the investment arbitration is 
a state and problems transcend the interests of the named 
parties justifies the progressive implementation of the principle 
of transparency in investment arbitration, which has been 
traditionally rejected in commercial arbitration. The acceptance 
of the institution of amicus curiae in BITs and in arbitration 
rules has resulted recently in various NGOs submitting amicus 
briefs in relevant international arbitrations. Additionally, 
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UNCITRAL and the ICC are currently developing two projects 
in the field of investment arbitration that are going to address 
the issue of amicus briefs. Taking all of this data as reference, 
this Article reflects on the most appropriate regulation of the 
institution of amicus curiae. It considers a multiplicity of factors, 
both internal—concerning the content and the submission 
process—and external—referring to the relationship of these 
nonparties with other participants in investment arbitration. 
Given the controversial nature of amicus curiae, any regulation 
must be multi-faceted. Against the multiple benefits preached 
mainly by NGOs, investors believe that the acceptance of amicus 
curiae brings various injustices. The proposal advocated by this 
Article is twofold. On the one hand, the acceptance of 
unsolicited amicus briefs should be governed by a set of criteria 
able to block any submissions that do not benefit the outcome of 
the arbitration and are excessively detrimental to the parties and 
arbitrators of the investment dispute. On the other hand, 
institutions managing investment arbitrations could establish a 
new institution exclusively and permanently dedicated to 
defending the collective interest. Although appealing, this 
proposal would require a major change to the system, so that 
success would only materialize in the medium to long term. 
